Natural Law

The concept of natural law is highly prominent in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274 A.D.), although one can see traces of this in the writings of early church leaders. These early fathers wrote using scripture as their basis rather than trying to explain natural law in philosophical terms, as was the common practice of the day. For example, Origen identified natural law with the law of God (Porter, 2002:228). Ambrose went on to relate natural law with the Mosaic Law explaining the latter is an extension and confirmation of the former (2002:228). Jerome also compared inner law with natural law (2002:228). Additionally, Augustine felt that there was a natural law, though it was entirely obscured by sin (2002:229). There has also been seen a connection between natural law and the Decalogue (Ten Commandments) and the Golden Rule (2002:229). The later is instinctual while the former is a written expression of natural law (2002:229). The issue of natural law has been debated in many circles as to its existence, its relation to grace, and its relevance in directing human affairs. Aquinas’ view holds that natural law descends from the primary precepts to conclusions according to moral principles (Gilby, 1951:357). This essay looks at Aquinas’ view of natural law, the development and use of it, and the positives and negatives of holding to it.  

Thomas’ basis for his viewpoint is Romans 2:14, in which Paul talks about the Gentiles who instinctively behave in a way which is consistent with the Mosaic Law found in the Old Testament, which they originally did not have. Thomas uses this to argue that all of humankind contains this natural law, and all of its precepts are based upon the fact that good is to be pursued and evil is to be avoided (Kreeft, 1990:515). He wrote of four different types of law. First, there is eternal law, which God uses to govern the cosmos and all within (Hall, 1994:23). Natural law is linked with this eternal law (Hall, 1994:23). It partakes with this type because natural law emphasizes distinctiveness of humans but also their continuity with other creatures (Wawrykow, 2005:86). Humans are different in that they possess a will and are rational, which allow them to govern their own actions (2005:86). Natural law is the law of human nature as ordered to its God-given end, and it inclines humans to proper behavior leading to their good (2005:86). It is also what commands us to our proper acts and ends by natural inclination (Hall, 1994:28). It is important to note that Thomas writes natural law partakes in divine law (Suma, 1990:504). Divine law is the law revealed by God in the Old and New Testaments by means of revelation (1990:506). The way that natural law is related to divine law is that natural law can only incline humans toward (connatural) goods (Hall 1994:23). Divine law then leads us to God, who alone can satisfy (Hall, 1994:44).
   
There are other characteristics about natural law. Aquinas argues that natural law is an inclination shared with all substances, in that, they all instinctively want to maintain good and avoid evil (Wawrykow, 2005:87). Natural law is also shared with animals in that we all have an inclination to reproduce and educate our offspring (2005:87). In another way, however, it is solely a human characteristic in that people desire the good according to their own reason, which include inclinations to know the truth about God as well as live in society (2005:87). Aquinas states that it is these basic precepts that help explain moral actions and allow for evaluation of these actions (2005:87). But, it must also be noted that Aquinas’ own emphasis on natural law is in terms of inclinations, not in terms of any set of rules (Hall, 1994:28). This is developed further by saying that natural law is basic human inclinations that must be developed over time and through processes of deliberation into moral and social practices (Porter, 2002:236). Also, he felt that natural law is not a device for making moral decisions but a way of enforcing that our nature is objectively knowable and that reason is crucial to understanding human nature (McCoy, 2004:152). He writes that this law is instructive rather than coercive, as it permits the knowledge of good and evil (Hall, 1994:28). Natural law requires free exercise of will and intelligence and, thus, human self-direction is not over-ridden by it (1994:28). He further writes that a link exists between our possession of natural law (being directed to our proper end) and our knowledge of being directed (which provides criteria for good and evil in action) (1994:28). Aquinas also had fundamental principles of natural law. He said that its universal inclinations are: the preservation of life, reproduction, nature and education of offspring, and knowing the truth and God (McCoy, 2004:152).

Aquinas’ view is similar to an idea first put forth by the Greeks, which had a view of a higher law which is better than human law (McCoy, 2004:151). This view was popularized by Plato’s rule of reason and Aristotle’s rejection of conventional, artificial distinction of what is good and evil (McCoy, 2004:151). Natural law is based on a belief that people have a purpose, given by God, and that our reasoning is capable of directing us in according to that purpose (2004:152). Likewise, it is aware if our actions are inconsistent with that purpose (2004:152). Hence, it could be said that natural law is not abstract; it is reason at work (2004:152). This can be enforced by the fact that Aquinas observed that people have natural inclinations to certain acts and ends which indicate a specific human nature, which consists partially of reason (2004:152). He says that natural law has been written as God has put it into the minds of men to be known instinctively (Hall, 1994:29). To be instructed by this law, people have to use practical reasoning that will, inevitably, be both self-educating and self-discovery (1994:29). Furthermore, natural law directs us towards our proper ends or goals. If taken rationally, then it also gives understanding of the goods which people are directed (1994:29). With this in mind, Aquinas intended that natural law to serve as a non-conventional standard of justice available to all rational creatures (1994:2). Taken a step further, there are secondary precepts which stand to Thomas’ primary axioms of moral law, which include the desire to know about God mentioned earlier (Wawrykow, 2005:87). These secondary precepts are conclusions to their forerunner axioms and are the practical reasoning through which fundamental natural laws are applied in the lived in world (2005:87).

The historical development of natural law led to it being seen as having direct moral and social implications in human society (Porter, 1999:250). For instance, the Decalogue, present through the natural law in every society, set constraints on acceptable forms of social institutions (1999:251). However, in the view of the scholastic theologians, society’s institutions are conventional, which is established through man and therefore need justification. They need it because they are not natural (coming from God) and innately good (1999:246). Examples of this include slavery and property. Unlike our present day societies based upon principles of capitalism, natural law, argue the theologians, promotes an egalitarian society and all possessions belong to all in common (1999:246). A person may wonder why we still have such institutions if they are in disagreement with our nature. The scholastics would argue these institutions are scripturally based and it is through Scripture that they are interpreting natural law (1999:254). These institutions, which are the primary focuses of the theologians of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, are problematic because they are inconsistent with the ideal of natural equality that is central to the scholastic concept of natural law (1999:259). A similar example facing many theologians today, especially in the west, is the problem of the human propensity toward violence, which is contrary to the foundational Christian ideal of peace (1999:259). Although it may be obvious why servant-hood is contrary to natural law, assuming that natural law emphasizes the freedom of all humankind, it may not be as obvious when discussing the issue of property rights. The reason is that, during the present time, ideally, all citizens of a given state, whether rich or poor have equal protection under the law and under citizenship. This was not the case under the feudal system of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. If a person owned property, usually being a lord, of nobility, or of high position in the church, it meant that they also had positive freedom. Likewise, most serfs worked property but did not have any of their own, limiting their freedom of choice, increasing their dependence on their masters, and distancing them from legal standing.

It all changed when society began to become more urbanized and commercial, creating a middle class (Porter, 1999:262). In the context, that the scholastics committed themselves to social change through the newly emergent universities, which were outlets of social mobility for certain people (1999:263). It is through this social fluidity that the scholastics believed the egalitarian emphasis of natural law would be promoted (1999:263). They were the ones who became the defenders of social changes leading into the early fourteenth century (1999:265). They used and developed natural law as a defense of the shared characteristics of humanity which gave social differences a secondary status and de-throne it from being the primary judge of a person’s worth (1999:266). It is from this concept of natural law that human rights began to take shape under such influential thinkers as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, who framed their arguments around the medieval idea of natural law (1999:269). The scholastics mentioned earlier also have something in common with those who defend human rights today in that both believed that there is an objective moral order that places constraints on social practices (1999:269). Also, like modern human rights activists that attempt to use legislation to promote their message, the scholastics saw the natural law as having juridical effects and they attempted to devise mechanisms, such as evangelical denunciation, to defend and enforce these effects (1999:275). As one can see, the scholastics attempted to regulate natural law effects and tried to set up organizations with which to do so without calling for an all-out revolution against the society at the time, which would have been disastrous in this author’s opinion.   

Pros & Cons

    There are positives and negatives about holding this view of instinctual natural law. The official Catholic version of the natural law implies a strong commitment to moral universalism (Porter, 1999:29). Therefore, moral norms through universal human nature are present and accessible to all reasonable men and women without the need for revelation (1999:29). Put another way, natural law can be reasoned by humankind so that they may know what is ethically good without specific revelation from God in the form of the Bible or other authoritative writings (Richardson, 1969:226). The great appeal of the Catholic version of natural law is that it has confidence and optimism that mankind can build a strong moral community among all persons of goodwill despite different religious upbringing (Porter, 1999:30). It is through this lens that the belief in natural law is a basis for justice and global social work for people, such as the well-known “Make Poverty History” campaign (Wawrykow, 2005:87). Some in modern society also see natural law as a source of dialogue between Christians and non-Christians, due to the fact that the principles are universal and can help promote unity (2005:87). Some have actually taken this one step further and removed the religious connection entirely, promoting natural law among humanity, which can be viewed either as a positive or a negative in certain ways. One of these thinkers was Hugo Grotius. He and others proposed a secular theory of natural law, and they detached morality from a religious context (McCoy, 2004:151). Instead, they used it to promote human rights and political actions (2004:151). Others in this category include Samuel von Pufendorf who unfortunately used extreme rationalism and, in doing so, discredited natural law. Another positive aspect of Aquinas’ version of natural law is that it is more realistic than dogmatic revelation or other theories of natural law from the classic period such as Aristotle (McCoy, 2004:153). The reason is that Aquinas takes into consideration human weaknesses and sin’s effects on making judgments (2004:153).

However, one negative aspect of Aquinas’s natural law is that it is very flexible in its approach. He holds the view that although there are universal moral instincts, as mentioned earlier, how humans discern what is applicable for a given situation will be subject to error and disagreement (McCoy, 2004:152). He also admits that there can be fault application of the principles of natural law which occur in certain instances (Wawrykow, 2005:87). Furthermore, he comments that passion can get in the way of natural law being practiced through practical reasoning (2005:87). He goes on to say that the transition between moral paradigms and the application of them can be blocked by evil persuasions and sin (2005:87). Another downside to natural law is that it is not enough to fulfill man’s longing. For Aquinas, God’s grace is the essential part that will satisfy, and it is completely dependent upon God for man’s happiness and contentment (McCoy, 2004:153). This point is further emphasized by Aquinas’s belief that natural law is part of a treatment of an “exterior principle” moving us to good, ultimately to God who “instructs us through law and helps us through grace” (Hall, 1994:23). It is this ultimate end that Aquinas would disagree with those who use natural law as means for social change, such as Grotius mentioned earlier. Although Aquinas would agree that natural law is universal to all humankind, his notion of it is in a broader context of bringing a person closer to God as the transcendent end, and that natural law is subordinate and incomplete to divine law (Wawrykow, 2005:87). Additionally, the concept natural law has been criticized because some feel that it has been used to justify the persecution of Jews in the twelfth century (Porter, 1999:281). The explanation, mainly stated by Anna Sapir Abulafia, says that, because natural law is grounded in a severe respect for reason, the Christian faith can be defended rationally, and that anyone who refuses to accept it is deemed irrational (1999:282). Furthermore, because, at this period in time, rationality was the defining trait that distinguished human being from beasts, anyone who rejected these claims were less than human (1999:282). However, Porter claims that this criticism does not hold any weight. The reasons are that, firstly, although the scholastic’s concept of natural law put a heavy emphasis upon reason, they also considered other aspects of human life and would not have de-humanized others on this basis (Porter, 1999:282). Secondly, although Abulafia brings up a good point about a high emphasis placed upon reason can lead to a rationale that de-humanizes others for not accepting certain views, the specific examples she uses for her argument that the scholastics did this are few and slightly inaccurate (1999:282). Finally, the anti-Jewish persecutions happening at this time were so because of a numerous set of factors including the attitude of the Crusades played a part as well (1999:283).

With the idea of natural law, it seems that humans have a universal sense of what is right and wrong in the world around them. For those who want to obtain peace and unity in the world despite religious and conviction difference, natural law is one of the strongest arguments to obtain it. However, for certain Christians, as this was the religion in which natural law was certainly popularized, of the Protestant background, natural law, if taken too far, slightly undermines the need for evangelism and the exclusivity of the Christian message of grace and forgiveness of sins. After all, if all of humanity knows what the truth is instinctively, why waste time preaching for them to change?   

Reference:

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